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ABSTRACT 
The action situation is a core component of actor-centered institutional analysis of natural 
resource governance. Institutional analysis frameworks have been extended to observe multiple 
situations structured into networks. If further operationalized, this extension can improve policy 
diagnosis of human–environmental interactions. This paper proposes two complementary ways 
to move in that direction. First, we propose the use of qualitative configurational analysis and 
game theory to study the interactions between situations and assess the contribution of each to a 
desired outcome. Second, we draw on centrality measures to assess the benefits and risks of 
implementing policies that aim to change equilibria in action situations. Both analytical 
strategies are applied to two cases involving irrigation and energy governance. In the Spanish 
case, centrality of the water allocation situation justifies a configuration of drought measures that 
also tackle cooperation in monitoring and infrastructure maintenance. In the Indian case, 
groundwater governance and adequate infrastructure capacity provision are necessary 
preconditions to enable coordinated technology adoption, which facilitates incentives for 
regulated irrigation. In both cases, some action situations’ positive outcomes are necessary in 
every configuration to guarantee optimal equilibria in the network. In the context of energy-fed 
irrigation systems, the proposed analytical strategies permit integrating interactions between 
water use, energy use and food production decisions in policy diagnoses. The analysis can be 
extended to identify archetypes, network closure, as well as structural and functional 
connectivity of networks in social-ecological systems. 
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1 Introduction 
The action situation (AS) is a core component of actor-centered institutional frameworks 
interested in the study of common pool resource governance (Anderies et al. 2004; Hagedorn 
2008; Kiser and Ostrom 2000; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2010). The concept refers to the interdependent 
decisions that different actors or groups can make and the joint outcomes that result from those 
decisions. An AS comprises a set of interacting actors or groups, their positions or roles, choices, 
information, and the outcomes attached to their choices. The situations can be both physically 
and institutionally shaped. The core of an AS is frequently modeled as a game and can involve 
dilemmas, conflicts, or coordination problems; entail operational, collective, and constitutional 
choices (Kiser and Ostrom 2000; Ostrom et al. 1993); and incorporate social–ecological and 
technical system properties (Anderies et al. 2004). Frequently, multiple situations jointly affect 
natural resource governance forming networks of ASs (Lubell 2013; McGinnis 2011). In this 
context, ASs can be associated to different governance functions, or to different levels of 
decision making, scale, and polycentricity (Blomquist and Schlager 2005; Kiser and Ostrom 
2000; C. Meyer and Thiel 2012; Moss 2004; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2010).  
Recent works have looked at natural resource governance from an AS network 
perspective (Kashwan 2015; Kimmich 2013a; McGinnis 2011), but without explicitly taking into 
account network structure. This paper contributes to filling that gap. The paper addresses the 
following questions: How can we meaningfully transfer network analysis concepts for analytical 
purposes in AS networks? How do linked ASs influence each other? What is the scope for 
inducing change across situations in a network to change outcomes of interest? Given particular 
policy problems or objectives, how can we distinguish analytically relevant from irrelevant 
situations? To address these questions, the paper uses centrality measures and configurational 
analysis and adapts them to the study of linked ASs.  
To test the usefulness of centrality and configurational analysis in AS networks, we conduct 
a qualitative analysis of two local irrigation governance cases. We contrast a successful case of 
drought-resistant irrigation with a failing case of energy and ground water overuse. The selection 
of irrigation cases was based on several reasons. First, much of the pioneering work on AS 
analysis was carried out in the context of community-based irrigation governance (Ostrom et al. 
1993). Second, irrigation systems have a relatively straightforward function—i.e., distributing 
water to users in the right amount and at the right time. Accordingly, it was relatively easier than 
in other, more multifunctional systems, to identify relevant outcomes and the network of 
involved situations and actors. 
According to the analysis, centrality can be especially informative with regard to the 
opportunities and risks of policy action. The configurational method, in turn, helps to trace the 
mechanisms, through which desired outcomes can be realized. Important caveats for further 
work are related to the definition of the boundaries of the AS networks and the agency of actors 
to influence outcomes across situations.  
Section 2 introduces the analytical framework. Section 3 describes the findings concerning 
centrality and configurations in the two AS network cases. Section 4 discusses the key insights 
from these results, implications for generalization, limitations, and potential paths to build on this 
analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 AS network analysis: Building concepts for diagnosis 
2.1 Action Situation Networks 
The analysis of networks of ASs has gained notable interest in recent years (Lubell 2013; 
McGinnis 2011; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2010; Schlüter et al. 2010; Sendzimir et al. 2010; Siddiki et al. 
2011). According to actor-centered network approaches, ASs are directly linked or adjacent 
(McGinnis 2011, p. 53) if the outcome of one situation directly influences the structure or actors 
in another situation. The idea of focal ASs refers to the AS whose outcomes are the main 
phenomenon under study. In the resource governance context, ASs can be associated with 
functions, including production, provision, financing, consumption, coordination, dispute 
resolution, rulemaking, and monitoring (McGinnis 2011). Each of these functions can involve 
the actions of multiple actors. Also, the number and type of actors involved in one situation can 
differ significantly from those in linked situations, and the game type can differ from one AS to 
the other.  
Four types of links across AS can be distinguished (Kimmich 2013a): the biophysical 
transactions, information, institutions, and actors involved in both situations. A one-mode 
network would only consider linkages between actors. A two-mode or bipartite network include 
linkages between actors and venues (Lubell et al. 2014). As shown in Figure 1, one can envision 
a two-mode network in which three actors An interact in game Γ1 and the same actors interact 
with a different actor B in a different event/game/situation Γ2. Figure 1 is an example of an actor 
linkage, whereby the actors An not only represent nodes but also the link between the two games. 
The two games could also be directly linked, if, for example, the collective outcome of Γ1 is an 
institution, transaction, or information that is changing the payoff structure in Γ2. ASs can, thus, 
also directly influence each other by changing the payoffs, the set of available choices, or the 
number and type of actors involved. This results in a more complex network that most closely 
resembles the characteristics of AS networks. 
 
 
Figure 1. A two-mode graph of actors (An;B) and events (i.e. games Γi) actors are involved in.  
 
2.2 Centrality 
Despite the increasing interest in AS networks, few authors have looked at how different 
structural properties of these networks affect outcomes. Social Network Analysis (SNA) has 
been particularly prolific in that regard. Centrality is one of the most well-studied and frequently 
used properties in SNA. There are different measures of centrality such as degree, closeness, 
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betweenness, harmonic closeness, or eigenvector centrality (Costenbader and Valente 2003). The 
most intuitive and popular among them is degree centrality, which counts the number of ties that 
an actor has (Freeman 1978; Scott 2012). Everett and Borgatti (2005) extend the concept of 
centrality to characterize groups of actors within networks, as well as to two-mode networks of 
actors and events. This opens up possibilities to understand relationships in networks in which 
not only actors but also ASs in the form of forums, associations, or events are in play (Lubell et 
al. 2014).  
Centrality and the associated indicator of degree are here proposed to feature ASs. This can 
provide a first insight at the relevance they play within a given network as well as explore 
whether network structure can make a difference in the diagnosis of resource governance. We 
can think of types of centrality based on four types of linkages: actor-, information-, institutional, 
and physically driven centrality. Although each type focuses on different links, all of them 
inform the possibility that a particular output of the AS has an influence over, or is influenced 
by, the output of other ASs. Thus, one straightforward way of operationalizing centrality is 
identifying whether an AS has any relevant linkage (i.e., a linkage with an influence on outputs) 
with other situations, mediated through actors, institutional constraints, information flows, or 
physical transactions.   
 
2.3 Configurations of insufficient but necessary conditions 
To assess the relevance of different ASs of a network, we propose a configurational 
approach. The configurational approach to causality has been put forward as a strategy for 
systematic comparative analysis, where cases are understood as a combination of factors, or 
conditions, that produce a given outcome of interest (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). Configurational 
analysis takes into account that parts, in our case ASs, can only be explained by considering the 
network, in which they are embedded. Configurational approaches have been used in 
comparative analyses (Ragin 1989), in organizational studies (A. D. Meyer et al. 1993), and have 
recently also been applied in multifunctional agriculture (Hassink et al. 2012), institutional 
analyses of irrigation governance (Hamidov et al. 2015), adaptation to climate change (Roggero 
2015), and in identifying archetypes of large-scale land acquisitions (Oberlack et al. 2016).  
One question that is usually addressed in configurational analyses is whether different sets 
of conditions are necessary and also sufficient to produce an outcome. A condition is necessary 
for an outcome if it is always present when the outcome occurs. A condition or configuration of 
conditions is sufficient for an outcome if the outcome always occurs under that condition or 
configuration. It is usually the case that a condition is not necessary or sufficient by its own to 
produce an outcome. Rather, outcomes are the result of INUS conditions, i.e., Insufficient but 
Necessary parts of a configuration which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient (Ragin 1989). This 
justifies an interest in identifying configurations of conditions rather than conditions alone.  
 
2.4 Equilibrium conditions in AS networks 
In this paper we propose looking at the configurations of ASs that lead to equilibria in a 
network. ASs can be modeled as games. From a game-theoretic perspective, a situation is in 
equilibrium when no actor has an incentive to individually deviate from a status quo (, foes, 
2004). By analogy, in an AS network, an equilibrium exists when no actor has an incentive to 
individually deviate in any of the situations, i.e., all situations are in equilibrium. As formalized 
by Economic Network Analysis (ENA) scholars, the structure of a network and the properties of 
its interdependencies determine the related feasible equilibrium outcomes, switching costs, and 
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thresholds (Farrell and Klemperer 2007; Galeotti et al. 2010). The likelihood of equilibrium 
shifts in a network of ASs can be partially informed by the type of game that actors play in each 
of the situations of the network. Two major categories of games considered by ENA scholars are 
games of coordination, such as the assurance problem, and games of conflict, such as the 
prisoner’s dilemma. In the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, defection is the dominant strategy, 
which usually leads to a suboptimal equilibrium outcome, while in coordination problems, both 
suboptimal and optimal equilibria exist and can be stable. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the socially 
optimal solution is potentially hindered by free-riding behavior, which is not the case in 
coordination problems (see e.g. Bowles 2004). In coordination problems, it is socially and also 
individually optimal to cooperate if the other does as well. Interests are aligned. There are no 
gains from free riding, but a risk of losses through coordination failures if the involved actors 
take different decisions. A key example is the AS of technology adoption that will be explained 
later (see section 3.2.1). All being equal, suboptimal outcomes are far less likely to change in 
prisoners’ dilemmas than in coordination problems. Conversely, optimal equilibria in games of 
conflict are less stable to changes in payoff structures than in coordination games. In 
coordination problems, information about expected behavior of others, for example obtained 
through communication, is crucial, while information alone cannot solve prisoners’ dilemmas. 
Following ENA reasoning, the analysis is carried out by first looking at all ASs in the 
network as they take different states (i.e., solved or unsolved games), and then exploring whether 
the configurations they form explain equilibrium outcomes in the focal AS. We expect that no 
AS’s outcome is necessary or sufficient by itself to explain focal AS outcomes. Rather, we 
expect that equilibrium outcomes in some situations are necessary parts of one or multiple 
configurations that are sufficient to explain those focal outcomes of interest. These are INUS 
situations and thus relevant for policy analysis. Irrelevant ASs are therefore those that do not 
make a difference in network equilibria given a particular configuration (see “NR” codes for 
some of the ASs in Tables 1 and 2). 
 
3 Configurations in two cases of AS networks 
We use two case studies to test the usefulness of the configurational analysis and centrality 
measure. The cases were selected from two typical irrigation infrastructures, namely 
groundwater and surface irrigation structures. We do not intend to compare both cases; rather, 
we focus on the explanatory value of centrality and the usefulness of the configurational 
approach for assessing AS networks. 
We sampled a Spanish case and an Indian case, each representing extremes with regard to 
the outcome of the focal AS: The Spanish case is a case of success, in which a cooperative water 
allocation equilibrium is stable despite the occurrence of drought shocks. In the Indian case, a 
persistent low equilibrium keeps energy utilization for irrigation and water use on a highly 
inefficient trajectory and leaves groundwater overexploited. 
In the analysis, we consider only the most salient physical, actor, informational, and 
institutional links between the AS of each case that explain the relative success/failure of the 
case (see Figures 2 and 3). For the configurational analysis we constructed two tables, one per 
case (see Tables 1 and 2).  Each table includes configurations of different states of the situations 
that can produce a desired outcome in the focal AS. We did not represent all configurations but 
only those we understood to be relevant based on existing knowledge of the cases (Kimmich 
2013b, 2013a, 2016; Kimmich and Sagebiel 2016; Müller et al. 2016; Villamayor-Tomas 2014). 
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In the Spanish case, the configurations reflect two paths through which actors have coped with 
droughts. In the Indian case, the configurations represent currently debated and additional 
possible ways about how to overcome the overuse of energy and groundwater. 
 
3.1 Irrigation systems in Spain: How to sustain a high equilibrium 
Spain is well recognized for the long tradition and autonomy of its irrigation associations 
(Blomqvist et al. 2005; Ostrom et al. 1993), which are rooted in both customary law and a water 
use right system that grants the associations the authority to manage water use within their 
jurisdictions. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Spanish government has actively 
engaged in the conversion of dry land to irrigated land and the promotion of new irrigation 
communities as a means of strengthening economic development (Bolea Foradada 1986). Riegos 
del Alto Aragon (RAA) is one of the oldest and largest state-promoted irrigation projects in the 
country. It currently encompasses 50 irrigation districts for a total of approximately 126,000 
irrigable hectares.  
One key challenge in large irrigation projects is water allocation across farmers 
(Subramanian et al. 1997). This challenge seems to have been overcome quite satisfactorily in 
the RAA project, as judged by the increasing production of irrigated crops over time 
(Villamayor-Tomas 2014).  
While droughts in Spain are not a new phenomenon, their governance still constitutes a 
challenge due to their increasing unpredictability, recurrence, and severity. The irrigation 
systems in the RAA project, however, seem to cope relatively well with droughts (Villamayor-
Tomas 2014). How can we understand the effective allocation of water among farmers in the 
RAA project under both normal conditions of water availability and drought? How does the 
network of situations help to explain the performance of the project, and what does this network 
look like? Can the configurational approach and centrality measures help us to understand the 
influence of the network of situations on water allocation?  
 
3.1.1 The AS network and linkages in the RAA 
One of the main functions of irrigation systems and organizations is to guarantee that each user 
receives sufficient water in a timely manner. Thus, the focal AS is water allocation (ASwal in 
Figure 2). In the RAA project, water is allocated by Water User Associations (WUAs) at the 
system level, and a General Association, and a Water Agency at the project level. WUAs within 
the project and farmers within each WUA cannot irrigate simultaneously due to infrastructure 
constraints. Thus, even if there is enough water available, farmers and WUAs need to solve a 
coordination problem to efficiently allocated water. This is done via an irrigation schedule (e.g., 
a turns rule). Linked to the focal situation, there are a cropping situation (ASwap), an 
infrastructure maintenance situation (ASimnt), and a monitoring (ASmon) situation, all of which are 
characterized as prisoner’s dilemmas (see Table 1 for the game type of each AS). The two other 
relevant situations are energy allocation (ASeal, coordination problem) and infrastructure 
investment (ASiinv, prisoner’s dilemma). Farmers participate in all situations. The infrastructure 
maintenance and investment situations (ASimnt and ASiinv) also involve governmental actors (i.e., 
political elites). The following descriptions provide the details for each AS in the RAA project 
case. 
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Figure 2. The action situation network in the RAA case.  
δ: institutional linkage; τ: physical linkage. Dotted arrows: linkages that change from non-drought to drought 
periods. 
Note: Actor linkages are depicted as dashed boxes around action situations of common actors, including farmers F, 
government G, opposition parties O, and utility staff U. Physical transactions (τ), and informational (ι) and 
institutional (δ) linkages are depicted as arrows. 
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Table 1. Set values of selected* configurations and their impact on the focal action situation 
(ASwal) in the Spanish case 
  ASwal ASwap ASmnt ASmon ASeal ASeinv 
Game type  CP PD PD PD CP PD 
Centrality*  4 3 3 3 2 3 
PATHWAYS        
1.1. Collective reduction of 
crop water needs  
 1** 1 1 1 NR NR 
1.2. Attempt to collective 
reduction of crop water 
needs but enforcement 
issues  
 0 1 1 0 NR NR 
1.3. Collective reduction of 
crop water needs but fee 
payment issues 
 1 1 0 1 NR NR 
2.1. Increase in water use 
efficiency  
 1 1 NR NR 1 1 
2.2. Increase in water use 
efficiency but rebound 
effect 
 0 0 NR NR 1 1 
2.3. Increase in water use 
efficiency but electricity 
price vulnerability 
 1 1 NR NR 0 1 
Game types: PD=Prisoner’s Dilemma, CP=Coordination Problem 
*Degree centrality scores are a count of the number of physical, institutional and actor linkages 
** Outcome in ASwal: Efficient water allocation during droughts. 
1: The dilemma or coordination problem in the AS is solved.  
0: The dilemma or coordination problem in the AS is not solved. 
NR: The action situation is not relevant in the current pathway.  
Note 1: An AS is not necessary if it is possible to reach a high equilibrium in the focal AS without solving the 
coordination problem/social dilemma in the AS under question (see, e.g., ASmon in 1.2). 
Note 2: The purpose was not to identify all potentially possible configurations, but rather to systematically compare 
relevant configurations according to our understanding of the cases. This applies also to Table 2. 
 
ASwap: Deciding what to crop at the beginning of the irrigation campaign 
This situation involves the decisions that farmers have to make at the beginning of the irrigation 
campaign regarding which crops to grow and on how much of their land. This is indirectly a 
decision about how much water to withdraw from the system during the irrigation campaign, and 
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it involves an asymmetric social dilemma. All else being equal, profitability is expected to grow 
with the extension of land cropped and with the land devoted to growing high-water-demand 
crops, such as alfalfa or corn; however, so is water demand, and the risk that water supplied 
through the irrigation system is lower than demand, particularly if a large number of farmers 
decide to intensify cropping or if there is a drought. In such a context of water deficit, some 
crops suffer, thereby resulting in suboptimal production at the collective level regardless of how 
the water is allocated. The asymmetry results from downstream users’ dependence on the 
behavior of upstream users (Ostrom et al. 1994). 
Relevant linkages between water appropriation and allocation are physical: Different 
acreages and types of crops cultivated determine the water allocation needs, and allocation 
performance shapes the amount and type of crops that are grown effectively. The equilibrium in 
this situation has been reached by means of rules that govern the relationship between water 
allocation (ASwal) and infrastructure maintenance (ASimnt). 
 
ASimnt: Maintaining shared infrastructure  
Currently, the irrigation systems rely on a series of reservoirs located in the Gallego and Cinca 
basins for a total storage capacity of around 930Hm3, as well as on water conveyance and 
drainage networks of 223 km each. This impressive infrastructure allows water to be brought in 
from the Pyrenees mountain range, which is located at the north of the system, through the 
systems. This is the main source of irrigation water, as precipitation in the area is limited to 
roughly 350mm (Vicente-Serrano and Cuadrat-Prats 2007). The maintenance of such 
infrastructure should not be taken for granted. The benefits of using it are shared by default (i.e., 
difficult to make exclusive), but the costs are private, inducing incentives to free ride.  
Maintenance decisions have a physical influence on water allocation if only because better-
maintained infrastructure should allow for better water flow, all else being equal. In addition, 
there is a rule linking both situations, according to which water allocation to farmers is 
conditional on their compliance with infrastructure maintenance duties. These duties are carried 
out in the form of shared labor at the plot level and maintenance fees that are paid to the WUAs 
and the Water Agency. 
 
ASmon: Monitoring compliance 
The existence of rules for water allocation and infrastructure maintenance is associated with a 
monitoring situation. Monitoring entails costs for those who carry it out, but the benefits are 
shared in the form of efficient water allocation and the conditions of the infrastructure. There is, 
indeed, the risk that some free ride on the monitoring effort of others, whether this takes the form 
of direct patrolling, complaints, or the payment of fees to employ guards. In the RAA project, 
monitoring is performed for the most part by guards whose positions, authority, and protocols are 
governed by more or less formal rules. This is represented in Figure 2 as the institutional linkage 
from monitoring to the water allocation situation. In addition, there is an institutional linkage in 
the opposite direction. Water is generally allocated according to a turn rule, which permits 
farmers to easily monitor and quickly identify the origin of disruptions in the water allocation 
process.  
 
ASeal: Allocating energy 
The recent promotion of sprinkler irrigation has resulted in the need to adjust schedules, as 
sprinklers require more frequent but less intensive irrigation turns than flood irrigation. More 
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critically, the technology transition has resulted in dependence on energy to pump water into the 
new systems. This is represented in Figure 2 as a physical linkage. The linkage would not be 
relevant if it were not for the recent liberalization of Spain’s energy sector. This liberalization 
has been accompanied by an increase in price volatility, as well as a new tariff system that varies 
depending on the season, day of the week, and hours of the day. This has resulted in the 
opportunity for farmers to coordinate to minimize energy costs—that is, by irrigating only during 
the low-price periods. The challenge is closer to a coordination problem than to a prisoner’s 
dilemma. Electricity costs are charged to each farmer, depending on the use of sprinkler 
irrigation and the amount of water withdrawn. Thus, the benefits of adjusting the irrigation 
schedule would be private (i.e., avoiding individual costs). That said, farmers still need to 
coordinate via a new irrigation schedule that satisfies all their needs during the low-energy price 
periods. This is represented in Figure 2 as an institutional linkage.  
 
ASiinv: Infrastructure investments: From hydraulic works to new irrigation technologies 
The construction of the RAA should not be taken for granted. The history of irrigation in the area 
is full of failed attempts by private corporations to provide the necessary infrastructure (Bolea 
Foradada, 1986). This illustrates the profound collective action problem at stake. In an 
impoverished rural area, funding such infrastructure required cooperation among a vast number 
of potential beneficiaries from the beginning, which involved considerable transaction costs. At 
the beginning of the 20th century, after the failure of several private corporations to carry the 
enterprise, the state took over the initiative. By means of a series of laws, the state funded and 
built the infrastructure and set a system of use tariffs to be paid by the associations’ irrigators 
who were benefiting from its use. More recently, strong subsidy programs have replaced 
investments in storage and conveyance infrastructure. The state now supports improvements and 
the introduction of efficient, pressurized irrigation technologies, such as sprinklers. 
The intervention of the state in the investment situation, both in terms of “infrastructure 
construction” and “irrigation technology,” can be associated with the dynamics of a game that is 
played among competing political elites who are aiming to gain the electoral favor of the farming 
lobby. At the beginning of the 20th century, the former colonial empire and economy were in 
decadence. Irrigated agriculture was then targeted by the political elites as a way to revamp the 
country’s economy. The important weight of the farming sector in the country made the 
enterprise of building dams and major irrigation canals an activity that governments used to gain 
political legitimacy throughout most of the century, both before and during Franco’s dictatorship 
(Perez Picazo and Lemeunier 2000). This required the effective coordination and division of 
labor between the government’s departments of public works and agriculture; the former was 
dominated by public works engineers and the latter by agricultural engineers. With the transition 
to democracy and the decentralization process in the 1980s, a number of regional political parties 
took over the irrigation development discourse and policy in an attempt to gain political credit 
vis-à-vis the central government. Coordination in the form of an assurance game played between 
regional and central governments was required to avoid a duplication of efforts, and guarantee 
that both governments could gain political legitimacy through the agricultural investments 
policy. With the participation in the European Common Agricultural Policy, the number of 
investments devoted to hydraulic infrastructure decreased and were replaced by the 
abovementioned “modernization” programs; however, the stakes of promoting investments have 
remained the same.  
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Finally, it is important to mention the coordination game that is played between the political 
elites and the farmers in the context of infrastructure investments. Both groups have stakes in the 
aforementioned investments, but both require the participation of the other for the investments to 
be worthwhile economically and politically. This implicit coalition between the political elites 
and the farming sector has proved to be particularly resilient since the beginning of the 20th 
century under the so-called hydro-agricultural policy community (Perez Picazo and Lemeunier 
2000). 
In terms of linkages, there is an obvious physical connection with water appropriation, as 
better storage and conveyance infrastructure, as well as more water-efficient technologies, 
determine the amount of the crops that can be grown. 
 
3.1.2 Coping with droughts: Insights about centrality and necessity  
In a drought situation, the reduced water availability jeopardizes the equilibrium between 
farmers’ crop water needs and the water that they can effectively use. By default, this means a 
switch to a suboptimal equilibrium in the cropping situation (ASwap); farmers have higher water 
needs than can be satisfied, and the uncertainty about who grows what increases (Blanco et al. 
2015; Osés-Eraso et al. 2008). This, in turn, jeopardizes the ability of farmers to coordinate water 
allocation efficiently, because downstream farmers do not know what to expect from upstream 
farmers. 
The main pathway taken to cope with droughts in the RAA project is represented by 
configuration 1 in Table 1. This configuration includes a self-imposed quota policy by farmers 
(ASwap); the strengthening of monitoring (ASmon), over water appropriation; and a reduction in 
the fees that farmers pay to maintain the irrigation infrastructure (ASimnt). The WUAs have no 
legal authority over farmers’ cropping decisions (Bolea Foradada 1986); however, they have 
authority over water allocation, and this grants them, via the quotas, indirect agency over the 
cropping situation. The quotas grant farmers a water allowance for the entire irrigation 
campaign, depending on the water stored in the reservoirs and the estimations of snow melt. The 
quota is allocated on an m3-per-hectare basis and enables farmers to adjust their cropping plan 
accordingly. This is represented in Figure 2 as an institutional linkage from water allocation to 
the cropping situation. The quota policy requires that farmers switch crops or reduce the 
cultivated acreage. The costs of switching crops for many farmers are high (Villamayor-Tomas 
2014), thus, they may prefer violating water allocation rules over facing those costs. To avoid 
this, the GCRAA and the WUAs intensify patrolling and keep track of the water used by each 
farmer (see dashed arrows from ASmon to ASwap and ASwal in Figure 2). The strengthening of 
monitoring represents the ability of the GCRAA to solve a second order prisoner’s dilemma 
problem, as monitoring benefits every farmer in the system without distinction but it is costly to 
provide. Failing to solve that problem would jeopardize compliance by farmers with the quota 
system (see configuration 1.2 in Table 1).  As compensation for the reduced yields, the water 
agency subsidizes part of the yearly maintenance fees that farmers have to pay (see dashed arrow 
from the ASmnt to ASwal in Figure 2). Again, failing to do so would jeopardize the ability of 
farmers to pay the fees, initiating a spiral of infrastructure maintenance and fee payment 
compliance issues. If farmers defect from paying their maintenance fees, others may retaliate by 
violating water allocation rules. Also, infrastructure leakages will likely affect water flows and 
allocation everything else being equal. That said the effects of all this may emerge only in the 
long term (see Table 1, configuration 1.3). 
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Table 1 includes a second pathway, which consists of the promotion by the government of 
infrastructure improvements (ASiinv) to increase water efficiency use. In theory, such a measure 
has the benefit of reducing water needs without putting a burden on farmers’ production (see 
Table 1, configuration 2.1). The reality, however, is different due to well-known rebound effects 
(Lecina et al. 2010). Encouraged by government’s subsidies, farmers have heavily invested in 
costly sprinkler irrigation technologies and have now to recover the costs by producing more (see 
Table 1, configuration 2.2). Also, farmers are now more vulnerable to energy market price 
increases as many of them need electricity to pump the water in to the sprinkler systems.  
The notable increase in energy prices in the last years has indeed put farmers in this and 
other Spanish irrigation systems in a difficult financial situation but has not necessarily 
undermined their ability to cope with droughts everything else being equal (Cabrera et al. 2010; 
Dumont et al. 2013) (see Table 1, configuration 2.3).  
Overall, the centrality of the water allocation situation, which is connected to the water 
appropriation, monitoring and maintenance situations, allows us to understand the importance 
that the quota policy is complemented with strengthened monitoring and partially also with 
subsidized maintenance during droughts. Indeed, as the above exploration of configurations 
illustrates, solving the dilemma or coordination problem in at least the water appropriation and 
monitoring situations would be necessary to maintain a high equilibrium during droughts in the 
project. By the same token, solving dilemmas/coordination problems in the appropriation 
situation would be necessary if the efficiency improvements pathway is to be effective. That 
would not be the case of the energy allocation situation.  
 
3.2 The electricity–irrigation nexus in Andhra Pradesh: How to enable the transition to a 
higher equilibrium 
A key challenge in the energy–water nexus is deploying energy-efficient irrigation. In India, 
agricultural irrigation accounts for more than one fifth of all electric energy end use. In the states 
of Andhra Pradesh, this share reaches one third. The diffusion of groundwater-based irrigation, 
accelerated by electricity subsidization, has decisively contributed to the Green Revolution 
(Badiani et al. 2012; Kondepati 2011), but also led to highly inefficient energy utilization. The 
policy led to a steady deterioration of electric infrastructure quality. Although state-owned 
distribution companies were partly compensated by the state for the subsidized agricultural 
electricity, they steadily reduced investments, maintenance, and staff budgets for rural 
distribution. This resulted in reduced monitoring capacities and grid maintenance, and it 
contributed to high voltage fluctuations, poor power quality, and increasing pump set and 
electricity transformer burnout rates. Non-standardized, unbranded, and often locally 
manufactured substandard pump sets, in combination with unqualified repairs, increase energy 
inefficiency and further deteriorate power quality. 
Analyses of the potential of demand-side management (DSM) in Indian irrigation reveal that 
comprehensive electricity-side motor improvements and water-side tube improvements can 
increase energy efficiency by up to 50% (Sant and Dixit 1996). Quality-approved pumps, 
standardized by the Indian standardization institute ISI, as well as BEE motors rated by the 
Bureau of Energy Efficiency, could decisively contribute to efficient use. The use of solely a 
capacitor, which is a small and inexpensive technical device that can balance out voltage and 
current to improve the power factor in a three-phase electricity supply, can improve energy 
efficiency by around 10% and reduce damage to pump sets and transformers. Farmers currently 
pay INR 6,000 per year for motor and transformer repair, constituting an equivalent of one third 
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of the expenditure on fertilizers and pesticides (Kimmich 2013b). The Andhra Pradesh 
Electricity Regulatory Commission realized the importance of DSM for increasing energy 
efficiency and set regulations to force DSM adoption in 2002. However, these rules diverge 
significantly from practice, as the status of DSM implementation reveals. Why has this 
electricity–irrigation conundrum remained so persistent, although the improvements could 
benefit every involved actor? Which situations’ outcomes are necessary to trigger equilibrium 
shifts in the focal AS? Are these situations central? 
 
3.2.1 The adjacent situations in Andhra Pradesh 
The analysis of a set of heterogeneous ASs can reveal why the existing low equilibrium of poor 
power quality, inefficient energy use, and constant motor damages is so persistent. The set of 
adjacent ASs that establishes the low equilibrium (see Figure 3) comprises a political economic 
problem of party competition, with parties promising subsidized electricity to win elections 
(ASpes); a coordination problem to improve power quality in the focal AS, because only 
simultaneous investments into DSM can improve power quality and efficiency (AScop); a 
sequential social learning and technology adoption heuristic (ASslta), which works against 
simultaneous investments that are necessary to achieve a positive outcome in AScop a common-
pool dilemma of infrastructure capacity appropriation or utilization (AScut), because every 
additional running motor subtracts from the available capacity; a dilemma of electric 
infrastructure capacity provision (AScap); a problem of coordinated collusion between farmers 
and utility staff (AScol); and a groundwater exploitation dilemma (ASgex) (see Figure 3 and Table 
2).The following analyses of ASs capture the dynamics of this low equilibrium trap and the 
linkages to adjacent situations. 
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Figure 3. The action situation network in the Indian case.  
δ: institutional linkage; τ: physical linkage, ι: information linkage. 
Note: Actor linkages are depicted as dashed boxes around action situations of common actors, including farmers F, 
government G, opposition parties O, and utility staff U. Physical transactions (τ), and informational (ι) and 
institutional (δ) linkages are depicted as arrows. 
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Table 2. Set values of selected configurations and their impact on the focal action situation 
(AScop) in the Indian case 
 AScop ASpes ASslta AScut AScol AScap ASgex 
Game type CP CP CP PD PD CP PD 
Centrality 3 1 1 4 2 2 1 
PATHWAYS        
1. Coordinated DSM 
adoption 
1* 0 1 1 1 1 0 
2. Groundwater governance 1 0 1 NR 0 0 1 
3. Self-governed capacity 
management 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
4. Pro rata** tariff policy 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
*Outcome in AScop: Improved power quality and energy efficiency for climate change mitigation and adaptation 
** With pro rata tariffs, electric energy is priced according to the quantities utilized. This does not necessarily imply 
cost coverage for the energy provided. 
1: The dilemma or coordination problem in the AS is solved.  
0: The dilemma or coordination problem in the AS is not solved. 
NR: The action situation is not relevant in the current pathway. 
 
 
 
ASpes: The political economy of subsidization  
This AS can be depicted as follows: In the late 1970s, new state-level opposition parties (O) 
emerged that could compete with the Congress party that constituted the incumbent government 
(G). Electricity subsidization for agriculture became a core issue because a large share of the 
votes could be gained through such a policy. The policy was easy to implement through cross-
subsidization and was credible because utilities are state owned, the regulatory agency is 
dependent, and the distribution of the benefit was easy through the existing electricity grid. This 
game of party competition has been repeated several times, and the subsidization equilibrium has 
persisted until today. An analysis of this political economy of electricity provision for irrigation 
indicates that the subsidization scheme is very likely to persist (Kimmich 2016; Shah et al. 
2012). Even a World Bank measure of regulatory reform could not change the policy (World 
Bank 2001), and farmers resist tariff changes as long as power quality remains poor. 
The subsidization policy creates a tariff rule, which shapes the costs and, thus, the incentives 
to invest in DSM. In Andhra Pradesh, a flat-rate tariff removes any incentive for efficiency 
improvements. In the opposite direction, the coordination failure in the focal situation of 
technology coordination (AScop) leads to poor power quality. Poor service creates an aversion 
among farmers to pay for electricity provision. 
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AScop: The coordination problem of power quality improvements 
The answer to the surprisingly low adoption of DSM can be found in the characteristics of the 
electricity infrastructure. The electricity grid creates interdependence between the adoption 
strategies of the farmers through the network structure and the common-pool resource properties 
of power quality. Because the use of a poor-quality pump set and not using a capacitor have a 
negative impact on power quality for all other farmers who are located at the same distribution 
transformer in the electricity grid, the choice of one farmer to invest in DSM is dependent on the 
choice of every other connected farmer. When no farmer invests in the use of a capacitor or a 
standardized (“ISI-marked”) pump set, the investment by one farmer does not improve the 
conditions for her nor for the others. Only if a sufficient number of farmers simultaneously invest 
in DSM does the overall power quality surpass a threshold level at which the positive effects of 
DSM on pump sets can be observed. This focal AS of the network, which is decisive for power 
quality and the eventual willingness to pay, is an assurance problem, because there is no free-
riding incentive: Not using a capacitor, for example, even negatively affects the farmer’s own 
pump set if every other farmer uses one. 
The experience of coordination failure negatively effects technology adoption by others, 
because of the negative experience with the respective technology. This is an information linkage 
to the social learning situation. Conversely, successful coordination could provide the 
information and understanding that could change the social learning strategy. 
 
ASslta: Social learning for technology adoption  
Farmers resort to a common practice with the adoption and implementation of new technologies: 
Only individual farmers experiment with the use of a capacitor, and the neighbors and peer 
network adapt to their experiences. Because of this, no experience with coordinated use by all 
farmers has been possible, thereby impeding any beneficial experience. This AS is different from 
AScop because the peer network is different from the group of farmers who are located at the 
same distribution transformer. This existing and actual AS exemplifies a social learning strategy, 
transferred from other technology adoption problems. This adoption strategy is unable to work 
when faced with a coordination problem, even though successful for many production 
technologies, such as introducing a new rice variety. Sequential adoption works against 
simultaneous experimentation. Yet, when the coordination problem becomes resolved in one 
instance, social learning can potentially catalyze adoption by neighboring farmers if coordination 
requirements are learned and transmitted. 
The social technology adoption strategy provides information that shapes the decisions in 
AScop, and it is thus represented with an information link in Figure 3. 
 
AScut: Infrastructure capacity utilization as an appropriation dilemma 
The adoption of DSM is not only impeded through coordination failure but also through 
insufficient infrastructure capacity, leading to low voltage and preventing DSM, such as 
capacitors and standardized pump sets, from working. Only locally assembled, non-standardized 
pump sets can stand such low-voltage conditions. Low voltage results from too many pump sets 
being connected to the same transformer. There is, then, a social dilemma resulting from the 
overuse of the existing capacity or from infrastructure under-provision. The conflict emerges 
only if the maximum capacity of the infrastructure is surpassed, in which case the provision of 
sufficient capacity for every additional connection becomes necessary.  
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This situation is located at the center of the AS network. The dilemma impedes the 
coordination of technology adoption but is also physically affected by coordination failure, 
because inefficient technology requires more capacity. Capacity provision is institutionally 
linked to the authorization process via the distribution utilities (AScap), as well as collusion or 
corruption networks (AScol). 
 
AScol: Collusion between farmers and utility: A coordination strategy 
Infrastructure provision is managed by a distribution utility, which requires a connection 
authorization charge to be paid by every farmer who utilizes power. This charge regularizes the 
connection and covers costs required for the provision of additional transformer capacity. The 
authorization process is influenced by many informal arrangements at the substation level. The 
capacity dilemma is only possible because some farmers can evade paying for their connection 
by colluding with the substation personnel at the electricity distribution company. This collusion, 
which results from a social network of mutual exchange of favors, is established through 
multiple games of coordination. 
Institutionally, collusion affects the capacity dilemma, enabling free riding, but it is also 
limited physically if the lowest level of available capacity is reached. Then, the utility can no 
longer provide capacity for free. 
AScap: Infrastructure capacity provision: A dilemma 
The procedure of infrastructure capacity provision becomes subject to this social collusion 
network. Farmers may evade paying their one-time connection authorization fee and still add 
additional load, but the utility does not add sufficient transformer capacity to cover this load. 
This provision game is further complicated by the fact that the utility often delays the 
authorization and provision of adequate capacity. Similarly, when a transformer is burned out, 
the utility often delays its repair due to insufficient ground staff. 
The utility and colluding farmers’ incentive to defect creates the institutions that shape the 
capacity utilization dilemma (AScut). The defection in the capacity dilemma, leading to capacity 
overuse, also corrodes the norm to obey the formal authorization process.  
 
ASgex: The dilemma of groundwater exploitation 
In addition to the electricity side, the governance of groundwater itself poses a dilemma. Due to 
increasing groundwater exploitation, the groundwater table decreases, and farmers have to invest 
in new bore wells to access the decreasing water tables and deeper aquifers. This results in a 
competitive process of overexploitation, but the deeper wells also require higher pumping 
capacity. Higher pumping capacity, in turn, requires sufficient transformer capacity to cope with 
the increasing load. The dilemma of groundwater abstraction is, thus, intricately linked with the 
dilemma of infrastructure capacity appropriation and provision. The link is physical. The AS is 
also affected by the capacity dilemma (AScut) because limited capacity prevents farmers from 
increasing the depth of water pumping. 
 
3.2.2 Centrality and configurations in the network 
From the inspection of the AS network depicted in Figure 3, the first result concerning centrality 
becomes obvious: The capacity dilemma (AScut) has both physical and institutional linkages to 
four other ASs and is, thus, in terms of the number of ASs it is linked to, the most central AS 
(see Table 2). The coordination problem and focal situation with the outcome of interest (AScop), 
that could improve power quality, thereby reduce pump damages and increase energy efficiency, 
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is connected to three ASs and is the second most central AS. AScol and AScap have equal levels of 
centrality, while the level of centrality is lowest for ASpes, ASslta, and ASgex. Thus, changes to the 
capacity dilemma have an effect on all other situations, except the subsidization policy, with 
potential spillover effects. A resolved dilemma can, for example, lead to increased groundwater 
exploitation. Unlike in the Spanish case, the focal situation is not the most central. 
A quantitative assessment of the feasibility of multiple equilibria (game type) and the impact 
on the focal AS (see Kimmich and Sagebiel 2016) reveal the following necessary conditions: 
The central AScut is a dilemma with a dominant low equilibrium of defection, with the low 
equilibrium leading to low voltage, thereby reducing the likelihood of farmers being able to 
coordinate on DSM investments in AScop. This is because DSM investments require sufficient 
voltage levels to work properly. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved by farmers without 
changing interactions with the utility staff (AScol and AScap). Clear rules of provision and norms 
against collusion could lead to adequate authorization and capacity provision by the utility and 
thereby reduce capacity constraints, resolving the dilemma, and thereby providing the ground for 
an equilibrium shift in the focal AScop. Currently, AScol and AScap enable unauthorized 
connections, and both lead to an asymmetric dilemma in AScut, because some farmers are able to 
collude with the utility staff. AScol and AScap cannot change the fact that AScut remains a 
dilemma in terms of physical payoffs but could potentially change the payoff rules. However, 
collusion and authorization procedures adhere to persistent norms that are unlikely to change. 
Both situations’ positive outcomes are, however, necessary if groundwater is overexploited and 
infrastructure capacity therefore overused (see configuration 1 in Table 2). Nevertheless, unlike 
the larger political economy, they are susceptible to local collective action. The political 
economy (ASpes) has been persistent despite regulatory changes (Henisz and Zelner 2006; 
Kimmich 2016; Shah et al. 2012). 
In addition, ASslta is critical because learning to coordinate on technology adoption would be 
necessary, albeit not sufficient, for an equilibrium shift in AScop. Currently, the focal situation is 
not perceived as a coordination problem, and farmers stick to sequential social learning 
institutions and adoption heuristics successful with other technologies, with farmers adopting 
only if first movers were successful. The overexploitation of groundwater (ASgex) can exacerbate 
the capacity dilemma (AScut) and, thus, indirectly prevent successful coordination (AScop), 
because low groundwater tables require higher motor loads to pump up water, which lead to 
voltage fluctuations that prevent DSM from working. When the dilemma occurs, decreasing 
groundwater tables require higher loads on the electricity grid to pump the water upward. This 
has a negative effect on the capacity dilemma (AScut), but installing additional capacity could 
mitigate this problem. Furthermore, overexploitation does not occur in all areas that have been 
studied.  
This differentiation contributes to finding the minimal configurations of ASs to induce 
change, described in Table 2. Inducing change could be possible by focusing on social learning 
(ASslta) in the areas in which capacity provision (AScap) and utilization (AScut) are sufficient for 
the level of groundwater exploitation (ASgex), and, thus, the coordination failure in AScop could 
be more easily overcome (configuration 1). Otherwise, overcoming groundwater exploitation 
would be a precondition to solve the problems on the electricity side (configuration 2). The 
farmers could also constrain themselves by reducing electric load on the grid, utilizing only the 
electric capacity that is available. Then, by solving the coordination problem for DSM 
investment, the available capacity could be used more efficiently. This configuration 3 most 
closely resembles self-governance of common-pool resources. If the political economy of 
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subsidization gets resolved and energy is priced according to quantities used, as in configuration 
4, farmers still need to coordinate on quality-improving DSM measures to improve outcomes in 
the focal AS, which entails a resolved capacity dilemma (AScut). 
The economic efficiency of solving coordinated technology adoption (AScop) is very high 
because of the low costs of related DSM technologies and of inducing a coordinated strategy. 
The costs of providing additional capacity in AScut first are considerably higher. This would still 
be necessary in areas of insufficient capacity, but could be facilitated by farmers’ updated 
expectations when observing successful cases, realizing the potentially higher payoffs. The costs 
of changing ASgex cannot be fully estimated, as several additional ASs on the groundwater side 
would have to be considered. This would require an extension of the boundaries, including 
groundwater recharge, the provision and maintenance of percolation tanks, or a cropping 
decision, as in the Spanish case (ASwap). ASgex could also become prohibitive with decreasing 
groundwater tables and may then require the identification of additional ASs on the groundwater 
side. There is also a caveat with regard to solving AScop. Successful technology adoption makes 
irrigation not only energy-efficient, but also more effective, leading to potentially more extensive 
groundwater extraction and exploitation. Under the empirically supported hypothesis that 
improving power quality may lead to the acceptance of electricity tariffs (Dossani and 
Ranganathan 2004), however, this could ultimately limit water use and induce efficient water 
use. Technologies and regulations could provide synergies to overcome potential rebound 
effects. This approach has been tested in the field (Sagebiel et al. 2016). 
 
4 Discussion 
The analysis of centrality and configurations offers insights into the logics of change and 
stability in AS networks. The Spanish case resembles a rather successful system that is robust 
against droughts, and the analysis points to situations, the governance of which explains such 
robustness. In the Indian case, the analysis explores potential interventions in order to trigger 
equilibrium shifts to escape from a low-equilibrium trap and, thus, induce effective change.  
In both cases, we find that central ASs are particularly relevant to understanding the 
feasibility of and dynamics associated to changes in institutions and outcomes. In the Indian 
case, the most central AS (i.e., capacity utilization) is not the most appropriate situation for 
efficient policy intervention; the situation partially explains the failure to implement DSM for 
increasing energy efficiency, but its dependence on both the collusive practices for infrastructure 
provision and underground water use dynamics questions the costs of an intervention (e.g., 
measures aiming to increase infrastructure capacity) and its impact on technology adoption. Still, 
after several unsuccessful DSM policies, which did not take into account coordination 
requirements, several states are now pursuing a strategy of increasing capacity. In the Spanish 
case, the focal situation (i.e., water allocation) happens to be the most central; thus, any changes 
that aim to protect it from the impact of disturbances are to be taken with caution due to potential 
spillover effects. Indeed, as the case illustrates, drought robustness of the irrigation system is 
explained with regard to the ability of the system to balance water supply and demand via a 
quota policy, as well as to the measures taken to counterbalance the spillover effects of the 
policy on the maintenance situation. 
We cannot generalize from our analysis which game types are more or less relevant to 
achieve desired equilibria.. In the Spanish case, drought robustness is to a great extent facilitated 
by a policy that reshapes incentives in the cropping (ASwap) situation, which is a dilemma; in the 
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Indian case, a shift to a higher equilibrium is associated with the promotion of coordination in 
the technology adoption situation (AScop), which can be self-enforcing, if established. As further 
discussed below, the relevance of the games actors play is mainly related to whether achieving 
cooperation in those games makes a difference (i.e., is necessary) to accomplish desired 
outcomes in the focal AS. 
A key insight resulted from the analysis of interactions across ASs. Some ASs and related 
outcomes were found to be necessary only within specific AS configurations that led to desired 
outcomes in the focal AS. When introducing a quota system, as exemplified by the Spanish case, 
an optimal equilibrium in the monitoring AS becomes necessary to enforce the system, but 
would be ineffective and therefore insufficient otherwise. In the Indian electricity–irrigation 
nexus, adequate capacity provision is necessary, but insufficient to enable coordinated 
technology adoption. Conversely, knowing how to coordinate technology adoption is insufficient 
if infrastructure capacity is inadequate to effectively use DSM technologies. 
Another insight concerns agency of actors to change behavior. Brown and Westaway (2011) 
define agency as the ability and capability to act freely, which depends on the structures of the 
social and physical environment in which the actor is embedded. This is well illustrated in the 
cases. The Indian case demonstrates that the agency of the farmers to escape the equilibrium trap 
can be quite high if the respective capabilities to deal with the electricity infrastructure are 
acquired. The electric utilities, despite being affected by the deteriorating infrastructure, can 
hardly change the low equilibrium outcome alone given the pumps used by farmers and therefore 
needs to involve farmers. In the Spanish case, public authorities have agency over situations that 
are not particularly relevant to cope with droughts; they can modulate fee payments during 
droughts and also subsidize infrastructure investments, but these measures have little to 
counteract the lack of water (at least in the short term). Finally, the limited authority of WUAs to 
tell farmers what to grow is compensated by their agency over the water allocation and their 
ability to set caps on the amount of water farmers can use during droughts.  
The cases also illustrate the importance of network boundaries, i.e., whether the network 
includes all relevant situations for policy diagnosis. The assessment of the ground water situation 
in the in Indian case is limited because the network does not include water-related situations such 
as the provision and maintenance of percolation tanks. Alternatively, the split of the water 
appropriation situation into a cropping AS and a water allocation AS is useful to understand the 
Spanish case, even if that distinction has not been made in community-based irrigation 
governance studies (Bardhan 2000; Ostrom 1992).  Network boundaries can vary depending on 
the types of relationships selected (Laumann et al. 1989; Wasserman and Faust 
1994)(Wasserman and Faust 1994)(Wasserman and Faust, 1994)(Wasserman and Faust 
1994)(Wasserman and Faust 1994). As highlighted by Social Network Analysis scholars, failure 
to include one or more of these links and correctly specify the network boundaries entails the risk 
of the “partial system fallacy” (Doreian and Woodard 1994). Care to prevent a “partial system 
fallacy” is especially important in AS networks, where we have to consider physical, 
informational, institutional and actor links simultaneously.  
The analysis of AS networks could be extended to meta-studies comparing multiple cases, 
which could help to identify archetypes of typical networks. The archetypes approach in 
sustainability research dates back to UNEP’s fourth Global Environmental Outlook (2007) and 
has recently been applied to large-scale land acquisitions, for example (Oberlack et al. 2016). 
Structuring networks into archetypes of recurring patterns could help to synthesize diagnostics 
and formulate common policy options for similar network archetypes. In the context of AS 
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networks, archetypes analyses could extend triadic network closure, as has been done for 
bipartite networks (Lubell et al. 2014). Game-theoretic approaches to formalization of 
archetypical AS networks could help to understand generative processes and potentials for 
change (Kimmich 2013a). Finally, the analysis of AS networks could inform research on 
structural and functional connectivity (Wainwright et al. 2011), especially for modeling social-
ecological and technical systems. 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we aim to advance the institutional analysis of resource governance situations by 
looking at the structure and dynamics of the networks they form. Specifically, we use a 
configurational method to analyze AS networks and we operationalize a measure of centrality to 
understand the feasibility and dynamics of institutional and equilibrium changes. We observe the 
types of links and the games actors play in different resource governance situations of the 
network. Centrality is measured by looking at the physical, institutional, informational and actor 
links between ASs. We identify configurations of situations that are necessary (albeit insufficient 
by their own) to explain desirable network equilibria. 
Through an application to two irrigation cases, we find that the assessment of centrality and 
configurations of “necessary but insufficient” ASs is useful to understanding the mechanisms 
through which desired outcomes are produced. As a caveat for future work, we need to better 
study the relationship between necessary situations’ outcomes and agency, and further 
systematize how to identify the relevant boundaries of AS networks.  
The cases were not used for comparative purposes. The findings do not allow for general 
conclusions about water or natural resource governance, but inform about the concepts and 
methods through which we can assess complex human-environmental interactions for policy 
diagnosis. An extension of the analysis of ASs that allows generalization about natural resource 
governance could focus on the meta-analysis of networks (i.e. cases) with similar or different 
structures and composition. Archetypes of typical network configurations could be identified.  
More generally, the approach is useful to identify conflicts and synergies between outcomes 
of different linked ASs in social–ecological and technical systems. In the context of energy-fed 
irrigation systems, synergies between groundwater governance, infrastructure capacity, and 
coordinated technology adoption, for example, improve energy efficiency far more effectively 
than any of those situations could do separately. In drought-exposed irrigation systems, the 
approach allows localizing trade-offs between allocating water efficiently and maintaining other 
important system functions, such as food production and infrastructure maintenance. 
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